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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Juror Bias - Posttrial
Hearing to Determine Actual Juror Bias Held Sufficient to
Satisfy Due Process Rights. Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940
(1982).
The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillos'
held that a posttrial hearing conducted to determine if a ju-
ror was actually biased because he applied for employment
in the prosecuting agency's office during trial satisfied the
rights of the defendant under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.2 Since the trial court had deter-
mined at a postconviction hearing that the juror was not ac-
tually biased, the Court concluded that the defendant's right
to a trial by an impartial jury had not been violated.3 In
addition, the Court held that the prosecution's failure to dis-
close the juror's application did not deny the defendant due
process of law in view of the trial court's determination that
no actual juror bias existed.4 The Court concluded that both
the district court, which had implied bias to the juror, and
the court of appeals, which concluded that the prosecution's
misconduct presumptively prejudiced the defendant, had
erred.5 Since no constitutional violation existed, the Court
reversed the lower court's order granting the defendant a
new trial because "[flederal courts . . . may intervene only
to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension."'6
I. THE DECISION
In this case the defendant, William R. Phillips, was con-
victed on two counts of murder and one count of attempted
murder by a New York state court jury. During the course
of the trial, one of the jurors submitted an application for
1. 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
2. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 102 S. Ct. at 946.
4. Id at 948.
5. Id
6. Id (quoting Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981)).
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employment as a major felony investigator in the district at-
torney's office. The prosecuting attorneys, upon learning of
the juror's application, decided that there was no need to in-
form the trial court or defense counsel.
After trial, upon learning of the juror's application, Phil-
lips moved to set aside the verdict on the ground of juror
bias. The trial court conducted a posttrial hearing into the
matter and concluded that although the juror's conduct was
indiscreet, it in no way evidenced a premature conclusion by
this particular juror to find the defendant guilty.7
After exhausting his state remedies, Phillips commenced
an action for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.8 The
district court granted the writ even though the court found
insufficient evidence to determine that the juror was actually
biased.9 The court concluded that the juror was impliedly
biased because the average person in his position would be
biased.10 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, but for a
different reason.'1 The court, without considering the actual
or implied bias tests, held that the prosecution's failure to
disclose its knowledge of the application denied Phillips due
process of law.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if the posttrial hearing on whether the juror was
actually biased was sufficient to satisfy the defendant's due
process rights. 13
II. HISTOIUCAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillis was primarily
concerned with the defendant's right to a trial by an impar-
7. Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940, 944 (1982). The Court described the standard
of review: "[t]he motion to vacate was denied by him [the trial court judge] in an
opinion concluding 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that the events giving rise to the
motion did not influence the verdict." Id at 943 (quoting People v. Phillips, 87 Misc.
2d 613, , 384 N.Y.S.2d 906, 918 (1975)).
8. Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
9. Id at 1371.
10. Id at 1371-72.
11. Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980), rep'd, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
12. Id at 1022.
13. Smith v. Phillips, 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
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tial jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment' 4 and applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.1 5 The dis-
trict court held the defendant's due process rights had been
violated on the ground of juror bias, while the court of ap-
peals concluded the prosecution's misconduct denied the de-
fendant due process of law.16
A. Juror Bias
In reviewing a claim of juror bias, the Court has in the
past used two tests, the actual bias test and the implied bias
test, to determine whether juror bias was in existence.
1. Actual Bias Test
The actual bias test has its roots in United States v.
Wood.'7 The Court in Wood upheld a District of Columbia
statute that allowed government employees to be impaneled
as jurors when the government was a party to the action. 8
The Court felt that to impute bias to a government employee
without any other evidence of partiality was "without any
rational foundation."' 9 The Court emphasized that
"[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind."20 The trial courts were charged by the Court with
safeguarding the rights of defendants at trial by determining
the existence of actual partiality.2'
The Court reiterated the holding of Wood in Frazier v.
United States22 and Dennis v. United States.23 Both of these
cases also involved government employees as jurors.
14. See 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982). The sixth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
16. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
17. 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
18. The statute was enacted by Congress to nullify the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909). The Court
in Crawford held that an employee of the government could not be an impartial juror
in cases where the government was a party to the action. The Court followed the
common-law rule that a master-servant relationship alone was sufficient to imply bias
to a juror.
19. 299 U.S. at 149.
20. Id at 145.
21. Id at 150.
22. 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
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The defendant in Frazier was tried and convicted of vio-
lating the Harrison Narcotics Act. One of the grounds for
reversal asserted by the defendant was that he was not tried
by an impartial jury because one juror and the wife of an-
other were employed by the office of the Secretary of the
Treasury, who was charged with administering and enforc-
ing the federal narcotics statutes. However, neither the juror
nor the spouse of the other juror was even remotely con-
nected with the Bureau of Narcotics, which handled narcot-
ics within the office of the Secretary of the Treasury. The
Court held that since the defendant challenged neither juror
for actual bias, although he was afforded the fullest opportu-
nity, his right to a trial by an impartial jury had not been
violated.24
In Dennis, the defendant was convicted for failing to ap-
pear before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the
House of Representatives, which was considering two bills
outlawing communist activities. Seven of the twelve jurors
were government employees who maintained they could
render a fair and impartial verdict. The defendant's conten-
tion was that the jurors would be afraid to acquit him due to
Executive Order 9835, the "loyalty order. '25 The Court held
that since the defendant was not asserting that the jurors
were actually biased, his right to an impartial jury was not
violated.26 In addition, the Court said, "[t]he way is open in
every case to raise a contention of bias from the realm of
speculation to the realm of fact. 27
The Court provided defendants a mechanism to prove
actual juror bias after trial in Remmer v. United States.28 In
Remmer a juror was approached during the defendant's trial
and told he could profit by acquitting the defendant. The
23. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
24. 335 U.S. at 513.
25. Generally, the "loyalty order" required the investigation of all persons enter-
ing civilian employment with the United States. Department and agency heads were
charged with the duty of making certain that disloyal employees hired prior to the
loyalty order were not retained. See 339 U.S. at 169.
26. Id at 172.
27. Id at 168.
28. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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juror informed the judge, who then consulted with the prose-
cuting attorneys. They requested the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to look into the matter, and after receiving its
report, concluded that the statement to the juror was made
in jest. Neither the prosecuting attorneys nor the judge in-
formed the defendant or his counsel during the trial.
The Remmer Court held that any private communication
or tampering with the jury about issues pending before the
jury created a presumption of prejudice. 29 The presumption
was not conclusive, but the burden of establishing that the
jury was not prejudiced rested with the government.30 The
Court in Rermmer established a posttrial hearing procedure
for determining actual juror bias. The case was remanded to
the district court with directions to hold a posttrial hearing
to determine whether the juror was actually biased.
2. Implied Bias Test
The implied bias test has been used by the Supreme
Court in various circumstances to disqualify impaneled ju-
rors or prospective jurors and to reverse a defendant's con-
viction. In Leonard v. United State32 the defendant was
convicted of two crimes in separate trials with different ju-
ries. The jury in the first case announced its guilty verdict in
open court in the presence of all prospective jurors who
would be used in the second case. The Court implied the
existence of bias in this situation and held that the jurors in
the second case should automatically be disqualified from
service.33
The Supreme Court in Turner v. Louisiana34 reversed a
conviction of murder against the defendant on the basis of
implied bias. During the course of trial, the jurors were se-
questered with two deputy sheriffs who also were the two
principal witnesses for the prosecution. The deputy sheriffs
29. Id at 229.
30. Id
31. Id at 230. However, evidence of the jurors' motives and influences which
affected their deliberations is inadmissible to impeach the verdict. See Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892).
32. 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam).
33. Id at 544-45.
34. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
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testified that they had not discussed the case with the jury.
The Court held that even if the case were never discussed, "it
would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme
prejudice inherent in this continual association throughout
the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for
the prosecution. 35
The Court has also implied bias to the jury when exten-
sive publicity pervades the judicial proceedings before and
during trial.36 The Court has held that identifiable prejudice
to the defendant need not be shown when the totality of the
circumstances raises the probability of prejudice. 37
The implied bias test has also been used by the Court
when the jury has not been composed of a representative
cross section of the community. A jury that has been se-
lected by systematically excluding women,38 blacks39 or per-
sons morally opposed to the death penalty40 has been held
by the Court to violate the defendant's right to a trial by an
impartial jury. The Court has stated that a jury so selected
creates the appearance of bias and increases the risk of ac-
tual bias as well.41
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Test
In a line of cases commencing with Brady v. Maryland,4 z
the conduct of the prosecuting attorneys had been consid-
35. Id at 473. But in Wisconsin see Cullen v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 652, 660-62, 133
N.W.2d 284, 288-89 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966), where the court held
that while it was error for the trial court to permit a witness' wife to serve as jury
matron, the error resulted in no prejudice to the defendants. See also Shelton v. State,
50 Wis. 2d 43, 51, 183 N.W.2d 87, 92 (1971), where the court adopted a rule which
required some showing of probable prejudice.
36. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). Compare Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) with Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). In Wisconsin see McKissick v.
State, 49 Wis. 2d 537, 182 N.W.2d 282 (1971). See also Briggs v. State, 76 Wis. 2d
313, 251 N.W.2d 12 (1977).
37. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-55 (1966).
38. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
39. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
524, 527 (1973), where the Court held that the trial court's refusal to make any inquiry
of the jurors as to racial bias denied the defendant a fair trial.
40. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
41. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
42. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecu-
tor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. Rav. 112 (1972). See Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d
474, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973), for application of the Brady rule in Wisconsin.
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ered by the Court in determining if an accused was given a
fair trial. In Brady the Supreme Court held that the prose-
cution's suppression of material evidence, favorable to and
requested by the defendant, violated the due process rights
of the defendant.43 In reaching its decision, the Court fo-
cused on the fairness of the trial to the defendant and not on
the punishment of society for the misconduct of the
prosecution.44
In United States v. Agurs45 the Court discussed the appli-
cation of the Brady holding in three situations in which in-
formation known to the prosecution, but not to the defense,
is discovered after trial.46 The first situation arises when the
prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony
of a key witness was false.47 For example, in Giglio v. United
States48 arrangements were made between a key witness and
the prosecution for possible prosecutorial leniency. The ac-
tual attorney prosecuting the case, however, was unaware of
the arrangements made and, as a result, the jury was told by
the witness that none existed. The Court held that a new
trial was necessary because the credibility of the witness was
an important issue in the case and his false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury.49
Second is the Brady situation itself in which the prosecu-
tion withholds information specifically requested by defense
counsel.5 0 In Brady the defendant and a companion were
found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to
trial, Brady's counsel requested that the prosecution allow
examination of the companion's statements. A statement in
which the companion admitted he had done the actual kill-
ing was withheld from Brady's counsel. In this situation the
Court was concerned with the effect the prosecution's actions
had on the fairness of the trial.5 '
43. 373 U.S. at 86.
44. Id at 87.
45. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
46. Id at 103.
47. Id
48. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
49. 405 U.S. at 154-55.
50. 427 U.S. at 104.
51. 373 U.S. at 87.
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In the third type of situation, exemplified inAgurs, either
defense counsel makes a general request for all exculpatory
matter or makes no request of the prosecution at all, and as a
result, specific exculpatory facts are not disclosed. In
Agurs the prosecution failed to disclose that the victim had a
previous criminal record. Since the information was not
known to defense counsel, it was not requested. The Court
acknowledged that in certain situations, even without a spe-
cific request, evidence not disclosed by the prosecution
would be of such substantial value in the trial that the trial
would be fundamentally unfair without it.53 The test used
by the Court was whether the nondisclosure of information
created a reasonable doubt of innocence that did not other-
wise exist.5 4 The Agurs Court concluded that since the crim-
inal record of the victim did not affect the trial court's
opinion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the prosecution's failure to disclose the information to
defense counsel did not have a material impact on the fair-
ness of the trial.5
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Justice Rehnquist,5 6 writing for the majority, employed
the actual bias test,57 but did not use the implied bias test.58
The Court also concluded that the misconduct of the prose-
cution did not have a material effect on the trial.59 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Court relied on the trial court's
finding that no actual bias existed.60
The Court stressed that the defendant's opportunity to
prove actual bias is part of the guarantee of an impartial
52. 427 U.S. at 106-07.
53. Id at 110.
54. Id at 112-13.
55. Id at 114.
56. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor.
57. 102 S. Ct. 940, 945-46 (1982).
58. Id
59. Id at 947-48.
60. Id at 948.
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* 61 I diijury. In addition, the Court noted that "due process does
not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in
a potentially compromising situation. ' 62 Instead, the Court
reasoned that due process is satisfied by a jury that is capa-
ble and willing to decide the case only on the evidence
presented, and by a judge who is watchful of prejudicial
events occurring and who will determine the effect of such
events if they do occur.63
The Court relied heavily on the Remmer decision, which
sanctioned posttrial hearings to determine actual juror bias
when private communications between the jury and others
have taken place.64 Applying Remmer to the instant case,
the Court held that since the trial court conducted a posttrial
hearing into the matter and concluded that no actual bias
existed, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial guar-
anteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.65
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's opinion,
but read the Court's opinion as not foreclosing the use of
implied bias to preserve sixth amendment rights. 66 The con-
curring opinion pointed out that although in most instances
a postconviction hearing is adequate to determine juror bias,
there are certain situations where a hearing may be inade-
quate to uncover juror bias.67 For example, a revelation that
a juror was actually an employee of the prosecuting agency
would be an extreme situation that would justify a finding of
implied bias.68 Justice O'Connor noted that no previous
case decided by the Supreme Court precluded the use of the
conclusive presumption of implied bias in appropriate
circumstances. 69
Justice Marsha, 70 in a dissenting opinion, felt that the
decision of the court of appeals should have been affirmed
61. Id at 945.
62. Id at 946.
63. Id
64. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
65. 102 S. Ct. at 946.
66. Id at 949.
67. Id at 948.
68. Id
69. Id at 949.
70. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
[Vol. 66:400
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for two reasons. First, the dissent maintained that when the
juror actively pursued employment with the district attor-
ney's office during trial, the probability of juror bias was
substantial.71 The dissent believed that the majority ignored
basic human psychology by concluding that an evidentiary
hearing after trial provided the accused with adequate pro-
tection against juror bias. 2 The dissent noted that it was
unlikely that the posttrial hearing revealed juror bias be-
cause an admission by the juror that he had plotted against
the defendant would have subjected him to criminal sanc-
tions and because the bias on the part of the juror may have
been unconscious. Thus, the juror should be deemed biased
as a matter of law since no amount of questioning would
have led to the juror admitting that he had actually been
biased.73
Second, the dissent was convinced that the defendant
was prejudiced by the prosecutor's failure to disclose during
trial that the juror had applied for a job with the district at-
torney.74 The dissent pointed out that if the prosecution had
disclosed the information during trial, the trial court could
have exercised its discretion and discharged the juror or held
a hearing during trial on the matter.7 5 The dissent con-
tended that a hearing during trial would have been far more
likely to have revealed bias because the pressures that af-
fected both the judge and the juror at the posttrial hearing
would have been substantially decreased at a hearing during
trial.76 The dissent believed that since the trial court would
have probably replaced the juror and thus eliminated the
substantial danger of juror bias, the misconduct of the prose-
cution was prejudicial to the defendant.77
IV. CRITIQUE
The use of only the actual bias test by the majority is yet
another restriction of federal constitutional safeguards. The
71. 102 S. Ct. at 952.
72. Id
73. Id at 952-53.
74. Id at 958.





reasoning of the majority is unpersuasive for a number of
reasons.
The majority relied on a line of cases commencing with
United States v. Wood78 which dealt exclusively with gov-
ernment employees sitting as jurors in the District of Colum-
bia. The Court in Wood balanced the right of the defendant
to a speedy trial with the right to a trial by an impartial jury
and concluded that judicial efficiency dictated the need for
government employees to be impaneled as jurors.79 It is dif-
ficult to understand how the facts of those cases relate to the
case at hand. In none of the cases cited by the Court were
any jurors employed by the actual prosecuting agency. In
contrast, the juror in this case applied for a position with the
district attorney's office during trial. The application was
not made to a remote government agency having no direct
relation to the case against the defendant. Instead, the appli-
cation for a position as a major felony investigator was made
to the prosecuting agency directly responsible for prosecut-
ing the case against the defendant.
Moreover, the majority applied the holding of Remmer v.
United States80 too broadly. As noted by Justice O'Connor
in the concurring opinion, Remmer involved the misconduct
of a third party and not the juror.8' Therefore, a posttrial
hearing to determine the effect of the third party's miscon-
duct on the juror is appropriate under Remmer. However,
extending the Remmer holding to allow a posttrial hearing to
satisfy the defendant's due process rights in the event of ju-
ror misconduct seriously imperiled the defendant's right to a
trial by an impartial jury. Although the majority stressed
that the defendant had the opportunity to prove actual bias
at the hearing after trial,82 this was almost impossible to do.
In this case, unlike the situation with a third party nonjuror,
by the time the posttrial hearing was held the juror had a
stake in the outcome of the hearing. If he revealed that he
was actually biased during trial, he would have been subject
78. 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
79. Id. at 148.
80. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
81. Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940, 949 (1982).
82. Id at 945.
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to criminal sanctions. 3 On the other hand, even if he felt he
was not biased, he may have felt an unconscious alliance
with the prosecution since he entertained hopes of being em-
ployed in the district attorney's office.84 Therefore, in this
case the posttrial heaing was clearly inadequate to safeguard
the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury.
In addition, the Court justified using the actual bias test
by saying that if a defendant were allowed a new trial every
time a juror was placed in a potentially compromising situa-
tion, few trials would ever be constitutional.8 5 However, the
Court failed to recognize the realities of why the juror was in
a compromising situation in the first place. Justice
O'Connor, in the concurring opinion, stated that a person
actually employed by the prosecuting agency and impaneled
as a juror may represent an extreme situation where bias
would be implied.86 In times of economic recession when
unemployment is high, securing employment is very impor-
tant to the majority of people in America. Oftentimes, one
searching for a job may be willing to do more for a potential
employer than one who is already employed, complacent
and secure in the position. It is difficult to understand why
bias should be implied in one situation and not the other.
Furthermore, the Court failed to discuss why the implied
bias test was not employed in this case. It is obvious that
there is some confusion regarding this question since both
the district court and the dissent believed that the test should
be applied. As the dissent stated, there was evidence that the
juror in this case had a serious conflict of interest87 which
created a substantial risk of prejudice. The Court has previ-
ously held that a jury whose members created the appear-
ance of bias and increased the risk of actual bias as well,
violated the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial
jury.88 One conclusion that could be drawn from the Court's
avoidance of the use of the implied bias test was stated by
the dissent: "This holding is utterly inconsistent with the
83. Id at 952-53.
84. Id
85. Id at 946.
86. Id at 948.
87. Id at 951.
88. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
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.Court's historical recognition of [the right to an impartial
jury] 9
It is unclear whether the Court foreclosed the use of the
implied bias test altogether or just refused to employ the test
in this case. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion viewed
the Court's decision as not foreclosing the use of the implied
bias test in future cases.90 Moreover, to foreclose the use of
the implied bias test the Court would have had to overrule
prior case law.9' The Court did not do so in this case.
Therefore, it appears the implied bias test is appropriate in
the proper circumstances.
Lastly, the majority oversimplified the question of
whether the prosecutorial misconduct had a material effect
on the defendant's trial. The majority stated that since the
trial court found no actual bias at the posttrial hearing, the
prosecution's misconduct did not have a material impact on
the trial.92 However, in reality, the misconduct of the prose-
cution affected the timing of the hearing into the matter, and
as the dissent noted, "a hearing during trial is far more likely
to reveal evidence of bias than a posttrial hearing. ' 93 There-
fore, as the dissent concluded, the defendant was actually
prejudiced by the prosecution's misconduct.94
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court in Smith v. Phillis will un-
doubtedly create confusion as to what test should be applied
to determine juror bias in order to safeguard the defendant's
right to a trial by an impartial jury. The Court's use of the
actual bias test in conjunction with a posttrial hearing, to the
exclusion of the implied bias test, ignores the realities of
human nature. The lines are thinly drawn between this case
and cases where the Court has found implied bias. Alterna-
tively, the Court's conclusion that the prosecution's miscon-
duct did not actually prejudice the defendant is
89. 102 S. Ct. at 952.
90. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
92. Id at 948.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 959.
94. Id
[Vol. 66:400
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unpersuasive.9 5 Undoubtedly the decision will have an ad-
verse effect on public confidence in our system of justice.
MARY B. BADER
95. 102 S. Ct. at 945.
